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Agricultural entities and businesses, like businesses and corporations in 
other fields, face a number of liability issues and concerns. Agricultural 
enterprises can encounter a number of liability risks, such as liability for the 
release of substances from the enterprises’ lands (such as manure and 
chemicals) that harm the land or property of another,
1
 liability for the 
escape of livestock that harms or damages the property of another,
2
 and the 
emerging risk of agritourism liability.
3
 The liability risks and exposures 
                                                                                                                 
 * Associate Professor of Legal Studies in Business, Florida State University, College 
of Business – Department of Risk Management/Insurance, Real Estate, and Legal Studies. 
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To Laura Elizabeth Grice – yours always. 
 1. See, e.g., Weber v. IMT Ins. Co., 462 N.W.2d 283 (Iowa 1990). The underlying 
facts of the Weber case involved the operators of a hog and crop operation who transported 
manure in manure spreaders on a public road in Wapello County, Iowa to fertilize their 
crops. Id. at 284. The operators allegedly left manure on the public road, which fell from the 
manure spreaders. Id. A neighboring farmer alleged the odors of the manure left his crop of 
sweet corn unmarketable. Id. The neighboring farmer filed a nuisance suit, and the operators 
of the hog and crop operation filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to compel its 
insurer to defend and indemnify them in the liability lawsuit. Id. at 284-85. The Iowa 
Supreme Court held that under the policy at issue, the manure fell within the definition of 
“waste material” and thus the pollution exclusion in the policy applied to manure as “waste 
material.” Id. at 286-87. 
 2. See, e.g., Schwerdt v. Myers, 683 P.2d 547 (Or. 1984) (holding that simple 
negligence was the proper liability standard to apply in a case involving liability for property 
damage which allegedly occurred due to the escape of a livestock owner’s cattle). 
 3. Several commentators have written on the emerging risk of agritourism liability. 
See, e.g., Terence J. Centner, Liability Concerns: Agritourism Operators Seek a Defense 
Against Damages Resulting from Inherent Risks, 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 102 (2009); 
Harrison M. Pittman, The Arkansas Recreational-Use Statute: Past, Present, and Future 
Application for Arkansas Landowners and Recreational Users of Land, 60 ARK. L. REV. 849 
(2008); Elizabeth Dooley, Note, Watch Where You’re Steppin’ Out Here: Why States Should 
Adopt Legislation to Promote the Diversified Farming Practice of Agritourism, 15 DRAKE. J. 
AGRIC. L. 455 (2010); Michael J. Lunn, Note, Class Dismissed: Forty-Nine Years Later, 
Recreational Use Statutes Finally Align with Legislation’s Original Intent, 20 DRAKE J. 
AGRIC. L. 137 (2015).  
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faced by agricultural enterprises have highlighted the importance of 
adequate insurance coverage as a risk management tool for farmers.
4
 
In a traditional negligence case, the plaintiff is typically required to 
prove four elements: that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, that the 
defendant breached the standard of care owed to the plaintiff, that actual 
and proximate cause are present, and that the plaintiff suffered damages.
5
 
As the law of negligence has evolved, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was 
developed so that a plaintiff could prove negligence through inference.
6
 Res 
ipsa loquitur (“the thing speaks for itself”),
7
 then, has been applied by 
courts in cases where direct evidence of negligence may not actually exist.
8
 
In essence, the doctrine allows the jury to make an inference that the 
defendant was negligent if the evidence “indicates (1) that the injury was 
probably the result of negligence, even though the exact nature of that 
negligence is unknown, and (2) that it was probably the defendant who was 
the negligent person.”
9
 The doctrine is typically applied in several 
particular fact patterns, including certain cases where a patient is injured 
through medical malpractice because a doctor or surgeon leaves a scalpel in 
                                                                                                                 
 4. See, e.g., Harrison W. Scheider, Today’s Farms Need Specialized Environmental 
Coverage, INS. J. (June 6, 2016), http://www.insurancejournal.com/magazines/features/ 
2016/06/06/410417.htm.  
 5. See, e.g., David G. Owen, The Five Elements of Negligence, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
1671 (2007). 
 6. Alan W. Stewart, Note, Are We Allowing the Thing to Speak for Itself? Linnear v. 
CenterPoint Energy and Res Ipsa Loquitur in Louisiana, 71 LA. L. REV. 1091, 1091 (2011) 
(stating that in cases involving res ipsa loquitur, “[t]he fact finder infers negligence based on 
his experience that such accidents do not occur in the absence of negligence.”). 
 7. Several commentators have discussed various applications of the res ipsa loquitur 
doctrine in the past several years. See, e.g., William R. Corbett, Unmasking a Pretext for Res 
Ipsa Loquitur: A Proposal to Let Employment Discrimination Speak for Itself, 62 AM. U. L. 
REV. 447 (2013); Dorothy Duffy & Marrielle B. Van Rossum, Of Surgical Sponges and 
Flour Barrels, and Why Medical Experts Are Needed Even With a Res Ipsa Loquitur 
Instruction, 7 DREXEL L. REV. 309 (2015); Aaron D. Twerski, Negligence Per Se and Res 
Ipsa Loquitur: Kissing Cousins, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 997 (2009); Andrew R. Loeffler, 
Comment, It Is Now Safe to Move About the Cabin: Revisiting Air Carrier Liability for 
Passenger Injuries Due to Turbulence Using a Res Ipsa Loquitur Theory of Negligence, 30 
N. ILL. U. L. REV. 445 (2010); Daniel J. Pylman, Note, Res Ipsa Loquitur in the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Liability Based Upon Naked Statistics Rather Than Real Evidence, 84 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 907 (2010); G. Gregg Webb, Note, The Law of Falling Objects: Byrne v. 
Boadle and the Birth of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1065 (2007). 
 8. See Stewart, supra note 6 at 1095 (“The most important requirement for the use of 
res ipsa loquitur is the lack of direct evidence to explain the injury . . . .”). 
 9. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 154 (West Group, 2000). 
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a person’s body following a procedure or surgery
10
 and cases involving a 
stationary or contained object that moves or escapes to cause injury.
11
 
Res ipsa loquitur also appears in cases involving agricultural interests. 
This Article is intended to contribute to the literature concerning the 
relationship between agricultural law and tort liability by examining cases 
involving the application of res ipsa loquitur to cases involving agriculture. 
Part II of the Article examines cases of res ipsa loquitur and crop and barn 
fires. Part III of this Article examines liability claims concerning 
applicability of the doctrine to situations involving the application of 
pesticides, herbicides, and other potentially harmful chemicals. Finally, Part 
IV examines cases involving escaped livestock and res ipsa loquitur. In 
sum, analyzing cases involving agriculture and res ipsa loquitur reveals that 
courts vary on whether it is appropriate to apply the doctrine depending 
upon the type of fact pattern in the case. 
II. Res Ipsa Loquitur and Crop and Barn Fires 
Several cases discussing the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine 
involve damages incurred to crops or barns in situations where vehicles are 
nearby. The majority of courts in these cases have held that the res ipsa 
loquitur doctrine should not apply. For example, in Emigh v. Andrews, a 
fire started on the land on which a truck hauling wheat from the plaintiffs’ 
wheat fields in Kansas was operating.
12
 The plaintiffs in the case stated that 
the typical method of hauling wheat away was through trucks, and when 
trucks are being operated in a careful manner, fires do not result.
13
 
The Supreme Court of Kansas emphasized that the phrase res ipsa 
loquitur means that the “thing speaks for itself,” which means that the thing 
or instrumentality—not the accident—speaks for itself.
14
 The Emigh court 
examined the plaintiffs’ petition closely and noted that it did not allege that 
the truck involved actually started the fire and only raised a presumption of 
                                                                                                                 
 10. See Ripley v. Lanzer, 215 P.3d 1020 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) (permitting application 
of res ipsa loquitur in case involving knee surgery in which the doctor allegedly left a scalpel 
blade in the plaintiff’s knee); City of Somerset v. Hart, 549 S.W.2d 814 (Ky. 1977) 
(allowing application of res ipsa loquitur in case involving scalpel blade left near plaintiff’s 
bladder following medical operation to remove kidney stones). 
 11. See Anderson v. Serv. Merch. Co., 485 N.W.2d 170 (Neb. 1992) (permitting 
application of res ipsa loquitur in case involving customer in store who was hit by a falling 
light fixture on the store’s premises). 
 12. 191 P.2d 901, 902 (Kan. 1948). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 903. 
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the truck causing it.
15
 The Emigh court stated that the inference of 
negligence which occurs in a res ipsa case “cannot be drawn from a mere 
presumption.”
16
 Finally, the Emigh court also discussed prior cases which 
noted that fires are common occurrences and in a number of instances occur 
without any fault of the defendant.
17




In National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Elliott, the Supreme Court of 
Oklahoma reached a finding similar to the finding of the Emigh court in a 
case involving a fire which destroyed standing grain.
19
 The defendant in the 
case was involved in the custom harvest of a wheat crop near standing grain 
that was ultimately destroyed by a fire.
20
 A truck was seen by the defendant 
on fire in the wheat field.
21
 Just like the Emigh court, the Supreme Court of 
Oklahoma also focused closely on the petition and found that there was no 
evidence to directly support the allegation that the truck caused the fire.
22
 In 
upholding the trial court’s demurrers, the Elliott court noted that the 
plaintiffs’ case still rested on conjecture.
23
  
Proof also was an issue in Hamilton v. Smith, a case decided by the 
Supreme Court of Colorado, in which the plaintiff’s wheat crop was 
allegedly destroyed by the negligent operation of a truck in a wheat field.
24
 
In Hamilton, the Supreme Court of Colorado remarked that although the 
plaintiffs had produced evidence that the truck had started the fire, the 
matter still rested on “conjecture;” thus, res ipsa loquitur did not apply.
25
  
Finally, evidentiary concerns were also present in Ballow v. Monroe.
26
 In 
Ballow, a wheat farmer filed suit against an adjoining farmer who allegedly 
caused a fire while swathing his field.
27
 The plaintiff testified that fires 
could happen in a wheat field even when one exercises reasonable care and 
                                                                                                                 
 15. Id. at 904. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 904-05. 
 18. Id. at 905. 
 19. 1956 OK 182, ¶ 13, 298 P.2d 448, 451. 
 20. Id. ¶ 2, 298 P.2d at 449. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. ¶ 12, 298 P.2d at 451. 
 23. Id. ¶ 13, 298 P.2d at 451. 
 24. 428 P.2d 706 (Colo. 1967). 
 25. Id. at 708 (“The res ipsa loquitur doctrine does not apply where on proof of the 
occurrence alone, without more, the matter still rests on conjecture, or the accident is just as 
reasonably attributable to other causes as to the negligence of the defendant.”). 
 26. 699 P.2d 719 (Utah 1985). 
 27. Id. at 721. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss3/4
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that fires cannot be avoided when swathing.
28
 The Supreme Court of Utah 
noted that despite the fact that this testimony was relevant to the 
defendant’s duty to take precautions to prevent the fire from spreading, it 
was not applicable to res ipsa loquitur.
29
 
Courts also may not apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur when some 
fault is attributable to the plaintiff. For example, the underlying facts of 
Thurman v. Johnson indicate that in a situation where the plaintiff may 
have contributed to a particular fire event, res ipsa loquitur may not apply.
30
 
In Thurman, a defendant arrived at the plaintiff’s barn with a truck to 
purchase twenty bushels of oats.
31
 The plaintiff gave directions to the 
defendant to park the truck in a rut close to the edge of the barn, in which 
the truck became stuck.
32
 The truck soon caught fire, and the plaintiff’s 
barn and its contents were destroyed.
33
 In holding that res ipsa loquitur did 
not apply, the Missouri Court of Appeals found that the plaintiff gave 
directions to the defendant regarding where to park and “knew or should 
have known even more certainly than defendant about the rut in which the 
truck stalled.”
34
 The Thurman court also noted that the plaintiff knew more 
information about the rut, “which was at least a contributing cause of the 




Courts have also denied the application of res ipsa loquitur in cases 
where the item that actually started the fire was not in the control of the 
defendant at the time of the incident. For example, in Anderton v. Downs, a 
wheat crop was lost due to a truck catching on fire.
36
 The defendant 
verbally informed the plaintiff’s employees that they were allowed to move 
the truck onto the wheat field as required to transport the wheat from the 
fields to a grain elevator.
37
 In finding that res ipsa loquitur did not apply, 
the Missouri Court of Appeals emphasized that the evidence revealed that, 
at the time of the fire, the defendant was not in control of the truck.
38
 
Because the doctrine requires that the item causing the damage or injury be 
                                                                                                                 
 28. Id. at 723. 
 29. Id. 
 30. 330 S.W.2d 179 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959). 
 31. Id. at 180. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id. at 182. 
 35. Id. 
 36. 459 S.W.2d 101, 102 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970). 
 37. Id.  
 38. Id. at 103. 
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Most recently, the Nebraska Court of Appeals also refused to apply res 
ipsa loquitur in a 2015 case involving a fire in a wheat field.
40
 In Lamprecht 
v. Schluntz, the court surveyed prior cases throughout the country involving 
field fires allegedly started by trucks, tractors, and farm equipment and 
reaffirmed the majority rule that the simple occurrence of a fire does not 
rise to the level of inference of negligence necessary for the application of 
res ipsa loquitur.
41
 The Lamprecht court examined the evidence submitted 
by the plaintiff and noted that the only evidence supporting some degree of 
culpability was one witness who claimed to see a “flash” underneath a 
tractor and “burnt wire” that was found under the same tractor.
42
 The 
Nebraska Court of Appeals concluded that “even though a fire in a 
wheatfield may not ordinarily happen, such an occurrence is not so unusual 
as to justify an inference of negligence based upon an alleged lack of due 
care by the owner and/or operator of a tractor or other equipment being 
used to harvest the wheat.”
43
 
While the clear majority of courts do not apply the res ipsa loquitur 
doctrine in cases involving crop or barn fires, at least two courts have ruled 
that res ipsa loquitur did apply. In Roddiscraft, Inc. v. Skelton Logging Co., 
the plaintiff suffered a loss of timber following a fire allegedly started by a 
tractor engaged in logging operations on an adjacent property.
44
 The 
Roddiscraft court examined all three elements of res ipsa loquitur
45
 and 
found all three were present.
46
 The court found that, based on both common 
knowledge and the expert testimony supplied by the plaintiffs, a forest fire 
does not ordinarily occur absent an act of negligence, and that a reasonable 
jury could draw an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant.
47
  
                                                                                                                 
 39. Id. at 103-04. 
 40. Lamprecht v. Schluntz, 870 N.W.2d 646 (Neb. Ct. App. 2015). 
 41. Id. at 656. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id.  
 44. 28 Cal. Rptr. 277, 280-81 (Ct. App. 1963). 
 45. Id. at 282-83; see also McLaughlin Freight Lines, Inc. v. Gentrup, 798 N.W.2d 386, 
389 (Neb. 2011) (“(1) The occurrence must be one which would not, in the ordinary course 
of things, happen in the absence of negligence; (2) the instrumentality which produces the 
occurrence must be under the exclusive control and management of the alleged wrongdoer; 
and (3) there must be an absence of explanation by the alleged wrongdoer.”).  
 46. Roddiscraft, Inc., 28 Cal. Rptr at 290. 
 47. Id. at 285. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss3/4
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The Roddiscraft court also noted that the evidence indicated that there 
was no question the tractor was under the control of defendant—no third 
persons were in the area, and it was likely that the accident was caused by 
defendant’s employees.
48
 In addition, the plaintiffs produced evidence that 
it was impossible for any action of the plaintiffs to have caused the fire.
49
 A 
key fact distinguishing Roddiscraft from the previously discussed cases is 
that the defendant had violated a statute.
50
 The exhaust stack on at least one 
of the defendant’s tractors did not have a spark arrester as required by 
California law.
51
 Therefore, the California Court of Appeals found that the 
trial court had committed error in not allowing a res ipsa loquitur theory to 
be submitted to the jury.
52
 
The Supreme Court of California also found the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur applicable in Seeley v. Combs.
53
 In the case, the defendant hauled 
hay from a field with a truck and stacked the baled hay in a barn.
54
 Unlike 
the Missouri Court of Appeals in Thurman, however, the Seeley court held 
that while bales of hay are loaded and unloaded in a barn from a truck, a 
fire would not occur absent someone’s negligence.
55
 In addition, the court 
found that the truck and hay were under the control of the defendant at the 
time of the fire and that the plaintiffs had taken no actions contributing to 
the fire, satisfying all of the requisite elements of res ipsa loquitur.
56
 
III. Res Ipsa Loquitur, Pesticides, Herbicides 
and Other Harmful Chemicals 
In contrast to the cases involving crop and barn fires, the majority of 
courts that have examined fact patterns involving agricultural damage due 
to improper applications of pesticides or the drift of pesticides or chemicals 
from neighboring farms have applied the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. 
Two decisions in Texas illustrate the division between courts on whether 
to apply res ipsa loquitur to cases involving damage incurred due to 
pesticide discharge. In Farm Services, Inc. v. Gonzales, a farm worker lost 
consciousness while operating a tractor due to liquid pesticides being 
                                                                                                                 
 48. Id. at 287. 
 49. Id. at 288. 
 50. Id. at 289-90. 
 51. Id. at 281. 
 52. Id. at 290. 
 53. 416 P.2d 810, 814 (Cal. 1966). 
 54. Id. at 812. 
 55. Id. at 814. 
 56. Id. 
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 Soon thereafter, the farm worker suffered a number of 





operator of the defendant’s airplane on the date of the incident testified that, 
while en route to crop dust, the chemical discharged unexpectedly from the 
plane.
60
 The defendant argued that the spray mechanism was not under their 




In upholding the negligence findings of the trial court on the grounds of 
res ipsa loquitur, the Gonzales court remarked that “the sudden discharge of 
a large amount of concentrated, toxic pesticide by a crop-dusting airplane 
en route to its destination is an event which ordinarily would not occur in 
the absence of negligence.”
62
 The Gonzales court also found that it was 
clear that the defendants had management and control over the sprayer 
mechanism at the time of the incident.
63
 Thus, the Gonzales court upheld 
the application of res ipsa loquitur.
64
  
In 2007, nearly two decades after the 1988 Gonzales decision, the Texas 
Court of Appeals again encountered a similar issue relating to malathion
65
 
                                                                                                                 
 57. 56 S.W.2d 747, 749 (Tex. App. 1988). 
 58. See Public Health Statement for Methyl Parathion, AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES 
& DISEASE REGISTRY (Sept. 2001), https://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/phs/phs.asp?id=633&tid=117 
(“Methyl parathion is a pesticide that is used to kill insects on crops. Usually, it is sprayed 
on the crops. Methyl parathion comes in two forms: a pure form of white crystals and a 
technical-grade solution (brownish liquid), which contains methyl parathion (eighty percent) 
and inactive ingredients in a solvent. The technical-grade methyl parathion smells like rotten 
eggs or garlic. Methyl parathion is a manufactured chemical, so it is found in the 
environment only as a result of its manufacture or use. Methyl parathion has been 
manufactured in the United States since 1952 and has been used to kill insects on many 
types of crops since this time. Because methyl parathion can be dangerous to humans, the 
EPA has restricted how it can be used and applied. Methyl parathion must be sprayed on 
crops from the air or from the ground in certain ways to minimize the danger of being 
exposed, and only trained people are allowed to spray methyl parathion. Methyl parathion is 
no longer used on food crops commonly consumed by children, and the maximum amount 
of methyl parathion that can be present as a residue on specific crops is regulated.”). 
 59. Farm Servs., Inc., 756 S.W.2d at 749. 
 60. Id.  
 61. Id. at 752. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See Public Health Statement for Malathion, AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES & 
DISEASE REGISTRY (Sept. 2003), https://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/phs/phs.asp?id=520&tid=92 
(“Malathion is a pesticide that is used to kill insects on agricultural crops, on stored 
products, on golf courses, in home gardens, and in outdoor sites where trees and shrubs are 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss3/4
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exposure in Parker v. Three Rivers Flying Service, Inc.
66
 In Parker, two 
homeowners filed suit against the Texas Boll Weevil Eradication 
Foundation, a nonprofit corporation that performs aerial pesticide spraying 
for negligently spraying malathion on two adjacent cotton fields.
67
  
The Parker court declined to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
68
 In 
contrast with the Gonzales court, the Parker court noted that the damages in 
the case were caused by the alleged negligent skill, judgment, and 
technique of the crop duster rather than a sudden, unexpected discharge due 
to a defect or failure in the spraying equipment of the airplane.
69
 The 
Parker court acknowledged that the evidentiary testimony provided that 
pesticide drift may occur in every application of pesticide, even in the 
absence of negligence; thus, res ipsa loquitur did not apply.
70
 
In some cases involving alleged pesticide drift, the plaintiff may not 
provide sufficient evidence to outweigh a defendant’s evidence regarding 
res ipsa loquitur. The 1965 Louisiana Court of Appeals case Watson v. Mid-
Continent Aerial Sprayers, Inc. is one such example.
71
 Watson involved the 
death of thirty-one cattle on the property of a neighbor adjacent
72
 to a 
                                                                                                                 
grown at home; it is also used to kill mosquitoes and Mediterranean fruit flies (medflies) in 
large outdoor areas. Additionally, malathion is used to kill fleas on pets and to treat head lice 
on humans. It is usually sprayed on crops or sprayed from an airplane over wide land areas, 
especially in the states of California and Florida. Malathion comes in two forms: a pure form 
of a colorless liquid and a technical-grade solution (brownish-yellow liquid), which contains 
malathion (greater than 90%) and impurities in a solvent. The technical-grade malathion 
smells like garlic. Malathion is a manufactured chemical, so it is only found in the 
environment as a result of its manufacture or use. Malathion has been manufactured in the 
United States since 1950 and has been used to kill insects on many types of crops since this 
time. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the EPA allow a maximum amount of 8 
parts per million (ppm) of malathion to be present as a residue on specific crops used as 
foods. Because malathion can be dangerous to humans, the EPA requires that a certain 
amount of time must pass between the time of application of the insecticide and entry by a 
worker into a field where the chemical has been applied. Usually, at least 12 hours must pass 
between application and entry, but in some cases, such as when workers are entering a field 
to hand harvest or hand prune the crops, time periods as long as 6 days must pass between 
application and entry into the field. In this way, exposure to malathion can be controlled and 
accidental exposures can be prevented.”). 
 66. 220 S.W.3d 160 (Tex. App. 2007). 
 67. Id. at 162, 165. 
 68. Id. at 168. 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. 
 71. 170 So.2d 149 (La. Ct. App. 1964). 
 72. Id. at 150. 
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property where a crop duster sprayed a fire ant poison (heptachlor).
73
 While 
the plaintiff offered testimony that granules of heptachlor were found on the 
premises and that the cattle became sick after exposure to the poison, the 
defendant offered expert testimony that heptachlor did not cause the disease 
and death of the cattle in question.
74
 Because the plaintiff did not show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the heptachlor exposure caused the 
cattle deaths, res ipsa loquitur did not apply.
75
 
Despite the Louisiana Court of Appeals declining to apply the res ipsa 
loquitur doctrine in Watson, other courts have found that res ipsa loquitur 
properly applies to pesticide drift cases. For example, the Supreme Court of 
Oklahoma held in Young v. Darter that a farmer applying 2,4-D herbicide
76
 
in his pasture was liable for damage incurred to a neighbor’s cotton crop, 
based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
77
  
Additionally, the Supreme Court of Colorado reached a similar 
conclusion in the 1979 case of Bloxsom v. San Luis Valley Crop Care, 
Inc.
78
 The facts of Bloxsom involved drift to a neighbor’s alfalfa crop 
following an application of 2,4-D to a barley field.
79
 The barley field 
owner’s crop-dusting company took a number of steps to protect adjacent 
                                                                                                                 
 73. See Heptachlor/Heptachlor Epoxide, AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE 
REGISTRY, https://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/substances/toxsubstance.asp?toxid=135 (last updated 
Mar. 3, 2011) (“Heptachlor is a manufactured chemical and doesn’t occur naturally. Pure 
heptachlor is a white powder that smells like camphor (mothballs). The less pure grade is 
tan. Trade names include Heptagran®, Basaklor®, Drinox®, Soleptax®, Termide®, and 
Velsicol 104®. Heptachlor was used extensively in the past for killing insects in homes, 
buildings, and on food crops, especially corn. These uses stopped in 1988. Currently it can 
only be used for fire ant control in power transformers. Heptachlor epoxide is also a white 
powder. Bacteria and animals break down heptachlor to form heptachlor epoxide. The 
epoxide is more likely to be found in the environment than heptachlor.”). 
 74. Watson, 170 So.2d at 150-51. 
 75. Id. at 151. 
 76. See Danielle Sedbrook, 2,4-D: The Most Dangerous Pesticide You’ve Never Heard 
Of, NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL (Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.nrdc.org/stories/24-d-
most-dangerous-pesticide-youve-never-heard (“One of the cheapest and most common weed 
killers in the country has a name you’ve probably never heard: 2,4-D. Developed by Dow 
Chemical in the 1940s, this herbicide helped usher in the clean, green, pristine lawns of 
postwar America, ridding backyards everywhere of aesthetic undesirables like dandelion and 
white clover. But 2,4-dichlorophenoxyacetic acid, as it’s known to chemists, has a less 
wholesome side. There’s a growing body of scientific evidence that the chemical poses a 
danger to both human health and the environment.”). 
 77. 1961 OK 142, ¶ 10, 363 P.2d 829, 832. 
 78. 596 P.2d 1189 (Colo. 1979). 
 79. Id. at 1190. Importantly, 2,4-D has minimal effects on barley but is very harmful to 
broad-leafed plants such as alfalfa. Id.  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss3/4
2018]        AGRICULTURE & RES IPSA LOQUITUR 689 
 
 
properties, including creating fires around the field to ascertain the direction 
and velocity of the wind, and utilizing flagmen to inform the pilot of 
conditions for spraying.
80
 Although the Bloxson court noted the precautions 
taken by the defendant prior to spraying, it still found that the unexplained 
damage “would not have ordinarily occurred in the absence of 
negligence.”
81
 Key to the court’s decision was the fact that other alfalfa 
crops in the area grew normally during the season in absence of the 2,4-D 
application.
82




The res ipsa loquitur doctrine has also been applied in some cases 
involving either the application of an improper pesticide or herbicide or the 
improper application of an otherwise acceptable pesticide. For example, in 
Wing v. Clark’s Air Service, Inc., the plaintiff alleged that an air service 
with which he contracted to apply a pesticide for a sugar beet crop in Idaho 
instead improperly applied the herbicide Metribuzin, resulting in the 
destruction of the sugar beet crop.
84
 The defendant argued, however, that 
the trial court had committed error in finding that res ipsa applied, 
contending that there was no direct proof that the defendant ever even had 
Metribuzin in its possession.
85
 The Wing court disagreed, finding that the 
plaintiff produced enough evidence to show that the damage to the sugar 
beet crop resulted from the defendant’s crop dusting operation.
86
 
In the 1991 Missouri Court of Appeals case Hall v. Superior Chemical & 
Fertilizer, Inc., the plaintiff alleged improper application of a weed control 
agent on soybean crops by a spraying company.
87
 The plaintiff alleged that 
while proper weed control had taken place on 276 acres of soybeans, 
improper weed control resulted in a reduced soybean harvest on twenty-
eight to thirty-two acres, located on two separate tracts of land.
88
 The Hall 
court affirmed the trial court’s application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, 
finding that  
                                                                                                                 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 1191. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. 683 P.2d 842 (Idaho 1984). 
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. 
 87. 819 S.W.2d 422, 423 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991), abrogated by KMS, Inc. v. Wilson, 857 
S.W.2d 525 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993). 
 88. Id. 
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[i]t was [defendant’s] agent who mixed the chemicals and 
sprayed the chemicals onto [plaintiff’s] crops. These crops were 
sprayed at the same time, in the same weather conditions, with 
the same chemicals, and by the same persons. Yet, two tracts 
received poor weed control. The trier of fact could reasonably 
have concluded that [defendant] had control over the selection, 
mixing and application of the chemicals sprayed on [plaintiff’s] 
crops which failed to retard the growth of weeds.
89
 
Finally, another fact pattern where courts have found that res ipsa 
loquitur applies are cases where a manufacturer supplies contaminated 
insecticide that causes damage to a plaintiff’s crops. For example, in the 
1954 Supreme Court of California case Burr v. Sherwin-Williams, the 
plaintiff alleged damages to his cotton crop after applying an insecticide 
containing 2,4-D.
90
 The trial court applied the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in 
finding the defendant liable.
91
 What makes the Burr case unique, however, 
is its rejection of the “exclusive control” rule. Generally, in a res ipsa 
loquitur case, the plaintiff must prove that the instrumentality that caused 
the injury was in the exclusive control of the defendant at the time of the 
injury.
92
 The Burr court, however, affirmed an exception to the “exclusive 
control” rule for cases in which the instrumentality was not in actual 
possession by the defendant at the time of injury, but also had not been 
improperly handled or modified by any subsequent possessor after the 
defendant relinquished control.
93
 In finding that the trial court properly 
applied the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, the Burr court noted that there was 
sufficient evidence before the trial court that unopened drums of the 




Similar to Burr, the Supreme Court of Arizona noted a question of fact 
existed as to application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in a lawsuit against 
                                                                                                                 
 89. Id. at 425. 
 90. 268 P.2d 1041, 1043-44 (Cal. 1954). 
 91. Id. at 1044. 
 92. See, e.g., Eaton Fruit Co. v. Cal. Spray-Chemical Corp., 445 P.2d 437, 440 (Ariz. 
1968). 
 93. Burr, 268 P.2d at 1044 (“The fact that an accident occurs after the defendant 
relinquishes control of the instrumentality which causes the accident does not preclude 
application of the doctrine provided there is evidence that the instrumentality had not been 
improperly handled or its condition otherwise changed after control was relinquished by the 
defendant.”). 
 94. Id. 
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an insecticide manufacturer following damage to a cotton crop after the 
spraying of an insecticide.
95
 In Eaton Fruit Co. v. California Spray-
Chemical Corp., the Supreme Court of Arizona noted that even though the 
plaintiff and defendant presented uncontradicted evidence before the trial 
court, it was erroneous for the trial court to direct a verdict against the 
plaintiff on the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine because of the 
existence of questions of fact.
96
  





 have also upheld application of the res ipsa 
loquitur doctrine in cases involving application of an incorrect insecticide. 
Analyzing the appellate cases involving application of pesticides and 
herbicides, a pattern has developed in which courts will generally uphold 
the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. 
IV. Res Ipsa Loquitur and Escaped Livestock 
In addition to cases involving crop or barn fires and drifting or 
contaminated pesticide, courts have also examined whether to apply res 
ipsa loquitur to cases involving escaped livestock. In a typical escaped 
                                                                                                                 
 95. Eaton Fruit Co., 445 P.2d at 441. 
 96. Id. (“Each party has presented an air tight case and one of them is obviously wrong. 
[Defendant’s] evidence is uncontradicted, and, if believed, would exonerate it from liability. 
However, [plaintiff] has presented equally uncontradicted evidence which entitled it to the 
permissible inference of negligence under the res ipsa doctrine. Which evidence is to be 
believed is a question of fact, and questions of fact, along with the weight to be given the 
inference, are matters for the jury. It was error to direct the verdict.”). 
 97. See DeVane v. Smith, 268 S.E.2d 711, 713 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980) (“Res ipsa loquitur 
creates a mere inference of fact and not a presumption of truth. Here the evidence showed 
defendants were in requisite control of the offending instrumentality; the airplane was in fact 
the causative agent and testimony that the defendants on several occasions admitted they 
were responsible for the damages to the cotton and that the damage resulted by allowing ‘2-
4-D,’ or a derivative thereof, to be sprayed on the cotton belonging to plaintiff. While there 
is not a complete explanation that the defendants sprayed the cotton with a herbicide known 
as ‘2-4-D,’ or a derivative thereof, there was sufficient evidence to support a mere inference 
of fact which is all that is required under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Therefore the 
plaintiff was entitled to have a charge given to the jury as to the doctrine.”). 
 98. See Stone’s Farm Supply, Inc. v. Deacon, 805 P.2d 1109, 1114 (Colo. 1991) (“After 
finding that the ammonium sulfate was contaminated with 2,4-D, and that the farmers had 
met the requirements for the use of res ipsa loquitur, the trial court required [defendant] to 
come forward with exculpatory evidence and to rebut the presumption of negligence. 
[Defendant] did not rebut the presumption of negligence and was held liable for the damage 
to the farmers’ potato crops, and there is ample evidence in the record to support that 
conclusion.”). 
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livestock case, a car or truck driver on a highway suffers property damage 
and personal injuries due to a collision with livestock, often cattle, that have 
escaped from a farm.  
Escaped livestock cases raise a key question: how did the livestock 
escape from a farm? As noted previously, the typical res ipsa loquitur case 
requires the presence of three elements:  
(1) The occurrence must be one which would not, in the ordinary 
course of things, happens in the absence of negligence; (2) the 
instrumentality which produces the occurrence must be under the 
exclusive control and management of the alleged wrongdoer; 




In cases involving escaped livestock, the second element—whether the 
livestock was in the exclusive control of the defendant—is typically not 
difficult to establish. The first element—whether the livestock would 
escape in the absence of negligence—likely requires an analysis of the type 
of pen or enclosure the livestock were in as well as the quality and 
condition of the pen or enclosure. The third element—whether the 
defendant can give an alternative explanation for the escape—may lead to 
conflicting evidence and testimony regarding potential causes of the 
livestock escape or of the resulting injury. Certainly, a farmer or an 
employee of a farm may negligently leave a gate unlocked or a pen or 
enclosure not securely fastened, leading to the escape of the livestock. 
Alternatively, it is possible that there may be a trespasser on a farm who 
intentionally tampers with a gate or enclosure, leading to an escape. Or, 
there could be an argument regarding the proximate cause of an accident—
a defendant may argue that the livestock would not have struck a car or 
truck but for the driver driving in such a fashion as to alarm or frighten the 
animal(s). Given the varied factual scenarios that exist relating to how and 
why escaped livestock cause property damage and personal injury, it is not 
surprising that there is a split among courts on applying the res ipsa loquitur 
doctrine in escaped livestock cases.  
The Nebraska Supreme Court is among the courts that have upheld the 
use of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in escaped livestock cases. In Roberts v. 
Weber & Sons, Co., a semi-truck hauling feed salt from Hutchinson, 
Kansas, to Fort Dodge, Kansas, collided with two to four cattle during the 
early morning hours at the intersection of a state highway and a county road 
                                                                                                                 
 99. See McLaughlin Freight Lines, Inc. v. Gentrup, 798 N.W.2d 386, 389 (Neb. 2011). 
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 The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the res ipsa loquitur 
doctrine could apply.
101
 To support its decision, the Roberts court noted that 
the evidentiary testimony revealed that the cattle pens at issue in the case 
were “constructed of the sturdiest and most expensive materials” and were 
essentially “secure, state-of-the-art cattle pen[s].”
102
 Thus, the Roberts court 
noted that cattle would not ordinarily escape in the absence of 
negligence.
103
 As for the second element of res ipsa loquitur, the Roberts 
court remarked it was uncontested that the instrumentality which caused the 
incident was in the exclusive control of the defendant.
104
 Finally, as to the 
third element of res ipsa loquitur, a question of fact existed as to whether or 
not the defendant provided a reasonable explanation on how the cattle 
escaped from the pens.
105
 
A unique issue arose in Nebraska nearly two decades after the Roberts 
decision concerning how a state statute interacted with the res ipsa loquitur 
doctrine. In McLaughlin Freight Lines, Inc. v. Gentrup, as in Roberts, a 
semi-truck collided with cattle on a Nebraska state highway.
106
 In the wake 
of Roberts, the Nebraska Legislature enacted a statute clarifying liability in 
situations involving livestock collisions with motor vehicles.
107
 In addition 
to reiterating that the plaintiff always retains the burden of proof in a 
negligence case
108
 and that the standard of care in a livestock collision case 
is ordinary negligence,
109
 the statute stated that “the fact of escaped 




The defendant in the Gentrup case contended that the statute supplanted 
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.
111
 The Gentrup court closely analyzed the 
language of the statute and noted that the wording of the statute indicated 
that “escaped livestock is not, by itself,” sufficient to raise an inference of 
negligence.”
112
 Under this interpretation, the Nebraska statute did not 
                                                                                                                 
 100. 533 N.W.2d 664, 666 (Neb. 1995). 
 101. Id. at 669. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. 798 N.W.2d 386, 388 (Neb. 2011). 
 107. Id. at 392. 
 108. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,274(1)(a) (2001). 
 109. Id. § 25-21,274(1)(c). 
 110. Id. § 25-21,274(1)(b). 
 111. McLaughlin Freight Lines, Inc., 798 N.W.2d at 391. 
 112. Id. 
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abrogate the common law doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The Gentrup court 
noted that evidence in the case was provided relating to the construction of 
the cattle pen as well as the defendant’s inspection of the pen following the 
escape.
113
 Thus, the Gentrup court affirmed the trial court’s utilization of 
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.
114
 
In addition to the Nebraska Supreme Court, a number of other courts 
have also approved of the utilization of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in 
escaped livestock cases, including the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit,
115
 the United States District Court for the District of 
Nebraska,
116
 the Supreme Court of Oregon,
117
 the Supreme Court of 
Idaho,
118
 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
119
 the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey,
120
 the Louisiana Court of Appeals,
121




                                                                                                                 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 392. 
 115. See Nuclear Corp. of Am. v. Lang, 480 F.2d 990 (8th Cir. 1973). 
 116. See Nuclear Corp. of Am. v. Lang, 337 F. Supp. 914, 919 (D. Neb. 1972), aff’d, 480 
F.2d 990 (8th Cir. 1973) (“The question in the present case is thus one of whether the 
defendant exercised that degree of care the law of Nebraska requires of one in his 
circumstances. Stated another way: Did the defendant exercise that degree of care which the 
ordinary, reasonable and prudent man would have exercised under the same or similar 
circumstances. The circumstances to which reference is made included the maintenance of 
livestock in a pen in close proximity to a heavily traveled public highway; leaving said 
livestock unattended for a period of twelve hours, with knowledge, in advance, that there 
would be an extended absence from the farm; checking of the fences surrounding the 
livestock prior to leaving, but failing to check at least one of the gates to the livestock pen. 
The evidence as to the sufficiency of defendant’s fences around the area he was keeping the 
livestock is conflicting. This Court cannot definitely state that they were inadequate. 
However, the Court can infer from the fact that the heifer got out of the pen that either a gate 
was left unlatched or that the fences were inadequate, or both. Thus, it is the opinion of the 
Court that the plaintiff has adduced sufficient evidence to raise an inference or presumption 
of negligence on the part of the defendant. This is to say, of course, that there is enough 
evidence to bring the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur into play. That doctrine is part of the law 
of the State of Nebraska.”). 
 117. See Watzig v. Tobin, 642 P.2d 651, 654 (Or. 1982) (“The Court of Appeals was not 
correct in stating that res ipsa loquitur would apply if no conclusion could be drawn from the 
fact that a cow escaped from a pasture other than that the accident was caused by the 
defendants’ negligence. In this case the operative incident is the escape of the cows. Res ipsa 
loquitur applies if the incident—the escape of the cows—was of a kind which does not 
normally occur in the absence of negligence and the negligence which caused the incident 
was probably that of the defendant.”). 
 118. See O’Connor v. Black, 326 P.2d 376 (Idaho 1958). 
 119. See Bender v. Welsh, 25 A.2d 182 (Pa. 1942). 
 120. See Vaclavicek v. Olejarz, 297 A.2d 3 (N.J. 1972). 
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However, a significant number of courts have declined to apply the res 
ipsa loquitur doctrine in cases involving escaped livestock. For example, 
the Arizona Court of Appeals declined to apply res ipsa loquitur in 
Brookover v. Roberts Enterprises, Inc.
123
 In Brookover, a couple was 
traveling along a state highway on open-range land in Arizona when they 
hit a farmer’s cow.
124
 The Brookover court focused on the lack of the 
farmer’s notice of a dangerous condition, as the accident was the first 
reported accident along the open-range land on the highway since the 
defendant began to lease the land.
125
 The plaintiffs alleged in the case that 
the defendant could have warned of the cattle by posting signs along the 
highway.
126
 Despite this argument, one of the plaintiffs conceded that he 
had driven along the highway four or five times a month prior to the 
incident and that he had previously seen cattle on the road.
127
 The 
Brookover court held that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine did not apply as the 
plaintiffs “did not show that a collision between an automobile and a cow 
on a highway through open range territory is a type of accident that would 
not occur absent negligence by the cow owner.”
128
 
                                                                                                                 
 121. See Honeycutt v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 890 So.2d 756, 761 (La. Ct. App. 
2004) (“We find that the trial court was correct in applying the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. It 
created an inference that the defendants were negligent. Absent negligence, a cow confined 
within fencing of proper height and maintenance will not wander into the center of the 
roadway in the middle of the night, endangering motorists. However, [the owner of the 
livestock in question] offered no plausible explanation except to testify that neither he nor 
any member of his family left the gates open and that he observed no open or drooping areas 
in his fence. He did admit that even new fencing will droop to some extent within a short 
time. [Plaintiff], on the other hand, testified that she consistently traveled this road on her 
way home and that she had noticed that some of the fencing in the area of the accident 
drooped significantly. The trial court made a credibility call which we will not disturb on 
appeal. Finding no manifest error in the trial court’s decision, we affirm its judgment in 
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants.”). 
 122. See Martinez v. Teague, 631 P.2d 1314, 1323 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981) (Sutin, J., 
concurring) (“I favor the rule which holds that an unattended animal on the highway is 
sufficient evidence to allow the jury to infer negligence on the part of those whose duty it is 
to restrain the animal because unattended animals do not escape their enclosure unless 
someone is negligent, a conclusion which is supported by an abundance of authority.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 123. 156 P.3d 1157, 1163 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007). 
 124. Id. at 1159. 
 125. Id. at 1161. 
 126. Id.  
 127. Id. at 1161-62. 
 128. Id. at 1163. 
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Along with the Brookover case, a number of courts have declined to 
apply the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in escaped livestock cases, including the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit,
129
 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,
130
 the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Arkansas,
131
 the Supreme Court of Kansas,
132
 the 
Supreme Court of Ohio,
133
 the Supreme Court of Mississippi,
134
 the Texas 
Court of Appeals,
135
 the Washington Court of Appeals,
136
 the Colorado 
                                                                                                                 
 129. See Vanderwater v. Hatch, 835 F.2d 239, 242 (10th Cir. 1987). 
 130. See Mercer v. Byrons, 200 F.2d 284, 288 (1st Cir. 1952). 
 131. See Poole v. Gillison, 15 F.R.D. 194, 199 (E.D. Ark. 1953) (“Counsel have not cited 
any authority in support of their contention that the res ipsa doctrine applies here, and we are 
of the opinion that it is not applicable.”). 
 132. See Wilson v. Rule, 219 P.2d 690, 695-96 (Kan. 1950) (“Plaintiff argues that even 
in the absence of statute, proof that the mule was unattended upon the highway was 
sufficient proof of negligence by circumstantial evidence to make out a prima facie case. It 
is true there are some authorities holding that way. What this argument amounts to is that in 
such a case the rule of res ipsa loquitur applies. To so hold would be to hold that the fact an 
animal escapes from a pasture or corral or from custody while being led, ridden or driven or 
while hitched or tied to a hitching rack is so unusual that no other conclusion can be drawn 
from the occurrence itself, than that the owner was negligent. Our knowledge of the ways of 
domestic animals forbid us doing that. We cannot assume merely because two mules were 
loose on the highway that the owner was negligent in the manner in which he confined 
them.”). 
After the Wilson case, in two subsequent cases the Kansas Court of Appeals declined to 
apply the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in escaped livestock cases. See Harmon v. Koch, 942 
P.2d 669, 673 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997); Walborn v. Stockman, 706 P.2d 465, 468 (Kan. Ct. 
App. 1985) (“Kansas courts have consistently refused even to consider the application of res 
ipsa loquitur to the livestock trespass case.”). 
 133. See Reed v. Molnar, 423 N.E.2d 140, 145 (Ohio 1981) (“A division of authority 
exists on the question of the applicability of res ipsa loquitur to animal escape cases. Without 
passing on the first branch of the foregoing test, we find that it may not be said that the 
presence of unattended cattle on the public highway is an occurrence that would not have 
materialized absent someone’s negligence. Thus, the doctrine is inapplicable and appellants 
were not prejudiced by the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on res ipsa loquitur.”). 
 134. See Hughes v. W & S Constr. Co., 196 So. 2d 339 (Miss. 1967). 
 135. See Lee v. Huntsville Livestock Servs., Inc., No. 14-02-00182-CV, 2003 WL 
1738418, at *3 (Tex. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2003) (“Appellant did not present any expert 
testimony that cattle ordinarily do not escape confinement and wander onto public roads 
without negligence, or establish that it is a matter of common knowledge that such an 
occurrence cannot happen in the absence of negligence. To the contrary, the uncontroverted 
evidence showed that the gate and locking mechanisms used by appellee were standard in 
the livestock industry. No testimony was presented by appellant demonstrating that it was a 
breach of ordinary care not to chain and padlock every gate to avoid cattle breaking loose, or 
that appellee’s actions in attempting to regain control over the cattle were below the standard 
of care. Appellant clearly attempted to show through cross-examination of appellee’s 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss3/4





 the Indiana Court of Appeals,
138
 and the New York 
Supreme Court Appellate Division.
139
 A true split in authority has emerged 
over the years. 
V. Conclusion 
Courts throughout the country vary on whether to apply res ipsa loquitur 
to cases involving agricultural interests. As the foregoing cases indicate, the 
following three general rules can be gleaned depending upon the fact 
pattern: 
 A majority of courts have held that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine 
does not apply in cases involving crop or barn fires.  
 A majority of courts have held that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine 
applies in cases involving pesticide drift, the application of 
pesticides by crop dusting and spraying companies, and the 
application of contaminated pesticides. 
 There is a split in authority regarding whether or not res ipsa 
loquitur applies in cases involving escaped livestock. 
                                                                                                                 
witnesses, and argued during closing argument, that specific acts and omissions of appellee 
caused the accident—such as not chaining and padlocking the gates, not closing the outside 
perimeter gates, not notifying law enforcement authorities of the escaped cattle, and not 
posting warnings along the road that cattle had escaped. Texas courts have held that res ipsa 
is not appropriate when direct evidence points to specific acts of possible negligence.”). 
 136. See Brauner v. Peterson, 557 P.2d 359, 361 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976) (“With regard to 
res ipsa loquitur, the presence of an animal at large on the highway is not sufficient to 
warrant application of the rule, i.e., the event must be of a kind not ordinarily occurring in 
the absence of someone’s negligence. A cow can readily escape from perfectly adequate 
confines.”). 
 137. See Barnes v. Frank, 472 P.2d 745, 746-47 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970) (“The fact that the 
cattle were on the highway does not in and of itself make defendant liable or raise a 
presumption of negligence against defendant. The cattle may have entered on the highway 
because of any number of factors, including possible acts of third persons. The duty rests 
upon plaintiff to prove defendant was negligent by a preponderance of the evidence.”). 
 138. See Taylor Bros., Inc. v. Sork, 348 N.E.2d 42, 45 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976) (“The 
question of whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be applied to supply an inference of 
negligence in instances where domestic animals escape from their enclosures appears to be 
one of first impression in Indiana. Other jurisdictions are divided on the question. In our 
opinion, the better view is represented by those jurisdictions deciding the question in the 
negative.” (citation omitted)). 
 139. See O’Hara v. Holiday Farm, 147 A.D.3d 1454, 1455 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 
2017). 
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Agriculture has a strong and vibrant role as a positive contributor to the 
fabric and growth of America’s economy.
140
 With agriculture’s prominent 
role, litigated cases have arisen relating to agricultural liability issues. As 
future courts continue to examine agricultural liability issues, it is very 
likely that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will continue to appear in 
courtrooms throughout the country and play an important role in resolving 
agricultural liability questions. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 140. On March 21, 2017, President Donald Trump signed a proclamation designating 
March 21, 2017 as National Agriculture Day. The proclamation stated: 
American agriculture is the largest positive contributor to our Nation’s net trade 
balance, generating 10 percent of our exports and millions of American jobs. 
America’s farmers and ranchers provide a safe and plentiful domestic food 
supply, which is vital to our national security. Moreover, they safeguard our 
sustainable resource base for future generations. 
President Donald J. Trump Proclaims March 21, 2017, as National Agriculture Day, WHITE 
HOUSE: PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2017/03/21/president-donald-j-trump-proclaims-march-21-2017-national-
agriculture. 
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